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Abstract
Impavido,  Musalem,  and Tressel  assess empirically the  e  The impact on stock market depth and liquidity is
impact of contractual  savings institutions  portfolios  nonlinear: it is stronger  in countries where corporate
(pension funds and life insurance companies)  on  information  is more transparent.
securities  markets, for example, depth and liquidity in  o  There is evidence  of a significant  heterogeneity
the domestic  stock market, and depth in the domestic  among countries:  contractual  savings have  a stronger
bond market. They discuss  how the institutionalization  impact on securities markets  in countries where the
of savings can  modify financial  markets through the  financial system is market based,  pension fund
lengthening of securities'  maturities.  contributions  are mandatory,  and international
The results  are the following:  transactions in securities  are lower.
* An increase  in assets of contractual  savings  - The authors do not find that the impact of
institutions relative to domestic  financial assets has a  contractual savings institutions on securities markets  is
positive impact on the  depth of stock and bond markets  explained by the overall  level of development,  education,
on average.  demographic structure or the legal environment.
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INTRODUCTION
Contractual  savings institutions (pension funds and life insurance companies)  and
financial markets  have been growing at fast rates  in many OECD (as in France,  The
United Kingdom and the United States) and non OECD countries (such as Chile and
South Africa) over the past 10-15 years.  The institutionalization of savings by pension
funds and life insurance companies  is bound to develop in the future as demographic
trends push for reforming pension systems in many countries, from unfunded to funded
pension systems.'
Although the primary  function of these institutions  is to provide sufficient,  sustainable
and affordable benefits for old age, recent work suggests that the spillovers on the
financial system are significant (see Catalan, Impavido and Musalem (2000) and
Impavido and Musalem (2000)), thus modifying firms' and banks' financing patterns
(Impavido, Musalem  and Tressel (2002a and 2002b)) by increasing the maturity of their
liabilities.
The aim of this paper  is to complement this recent work by focusing on several  aspects
linking contractual  savings institutions to securities markets that have not yet been
investigated.  The underlying motivation  is to understand whether the development of
contractual savings  leads to the development of securities markets,  and which factors
magnify or dampen this impact.
We address the following questions: under which circumstances  is the development of
contractual savings  likely to have a stronger impact on securities markets? To what extent
do underlying factors, including the level of economic development, the legal
environment, the demographic trends, et cetera, determine the short-run dynamics  of
contractual  savings development within and across countries? Once controlled for such
slow-moving factors, that are likely to impact both contractual savings and domestic
securities markets, do contractual  savings institutions have an impact on domestic
securities markets?
We focus on the short-term dynamics of stock market depth and liquidity, and bond
market depth2 and our results are summarized  in the following points:
*  First, after controlling for several sources of bias that may affect the correlation
between financial market variables and the development of contractual  savings,
'Poterba  and Samwick (1995)  provide empirical evidence of institutionalization  of savings in the US.
They notice how the principal  postwar trend in ownership  has been a decline in stock owned  by households
directly and an increase in ownership  through various financial intermediaries.  Bossone et al.  (2002),
provide preliminary empirical results on how the development of financial infrastructure  plays a key role in
promoting non-bank financial intermediation.  They also provide an explanation  for why traditional
banking predominates  in the early stages of economic development,  while non-bank financial
intermediation  predominates  in more advanced  stages of development.  Hence, generalizing the argument
that may seem to be limited  here only to the effect related to the promotion  of pensions and life insurance
schemes.
2  Markets depth and liquidity are defined  as market capitalization  and value traded relative to GDP,
respectively.  Bond market capitalization is the value of bonds outstanding (the aggregate  of public and
private  bonds).
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we find that the institutionalization of savings leads to the deepening of stock
and bond markets.
o  Next, there is evidence of substantial heterogeneity across countries.  First, the
development  of contractual  savings is associated with an increase  in stock
market capitalization relative to GDP in countries that structurally rely more on
stock market finance;  it is associated with an increase in bond market
capitalization relative to GDP in countries that structurally rely more on bank
finance.  Second, contractual savings development leads to an increase in stock
market capitalization and stock market value traded relative to GDP in
countries in which pension contributions are mandatory, while these two effects
are less clear in countries in which pension contributions are voluntary.  The
impact on market value traded is found not to be significantly different from
zero when we consider the complete set of countries  in our dataset.  Third, the
impact on stock market capitalization relative to GDP is significant when cross-
border transactions  in securities are not too large.  Finally, structural features of
the securities market, such as transparency also matters: the impact of
contractual  savings is greater in countries with better accounting standards
o  Finally, our results suggest that the impact of contractual savings on the short-
term dynamics of securities markets is not explained by other structural
characteristics  of the economies in our sample, such as the overall  level of
development, openness to trade, the legal environment and the demographic
structure.  We interpret this result as evidence that policy decisions that shape
the evolution of contractual  savings institutions do matter and that the impact of
contractual  savings on securities markets is not due  solely to slow-moving
country characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section I summarizes the mechanisms through
which contractual savings  institutions affect domestic  securities markets.  In Section II,
we describe the empirical model and the strategy chosen for the rest of the paper.  Results
reported in the appendix are presented  in Section III.  Conclusions follow in Section IV.
WYR__  lE  9WEEM  COMTRqAMcAlL  SAVINGS
bWsm10uTEna)1i  AbmD  Rjb S.'F I.  S  l!_--  l  MlAlRKETS
In this section, we discuss how the development of contractual  savings institutions might
affect the functioning of financial markets.  A more detailed discussion of this topic can
be found in Catalan, Impavido and Musalem (2000), Blommestein (2001), Blommestein
and Funke (1998), Davis and Steil (2001), Impavido and Musalem (2000), Impavido,
Musalem  and Tressel (2002a and 2002b), Reisen (2000), and Vittas (1999).
First, the development of contractual savings institutions provides an institutional
framework favoring the accumulation  of long-term capital.  By increasing the demand
for long-termn  financial assets, it could thus promote financial market development,  and
3  For instance, the existence of transaction costs on capital markets, the ability to diversify  risk, and the
long-term commitments of contractual savings institutions explain why they may be more willing to hold
long-term securities than individual  investors, and require lower risk and liquidity premia.
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improve the capacity to manage financial  risks.  Second, contractual  savings institutions
may compete with investment banks, leading to more efficient primary markets.  Third,
given their need for asset management, their development is likely to enhance financial
innovation and modernization  of trading systems.  Fourth, they play a major role in
enhancing market discipline, for instance by stimulating transparency  on securities
markets, they have the ability to actively promote the interests of minority shareholders
of the firms in which they invest.  Next, such institutionalization  of savings may deepen
the public debt market, and progressively help to build the yield curve, thus stimulating
the private debt and other financial instrument markets.
The supply of securities by the private and public sector may in turn be affected, as the
costs of raising funds on stock and bond markets decreases.
As argued by Vittas (1999 and 2002), preconditions for the development  of contractual
savings, and particularly a pension reform,  are less stringent than expected if a gradual
approach is chosen.  Impavido, Musalem and Vittas (2002) provide an analytical
framework for countries with a small financial system.  They include sound
macroeconomic  policies, the existence of a core of efficient and sound banking and
insurance institutions,  and a lasting commitment for the creation of an effective
regulatory and supervisory agency and reform of the capital markets.  The long-term
commitment of governments  is particularly  crucial, as a volatile macroeconomic
environment would undermine the development of contractual savings; fiscal policy must
be prudent:  "as long as the levels of nominal debt are too high, long term maturities are
not attainable  as the credibility of the anti-inflationary  stance of the government  is
undermined." 45
The impact of contractual savings  institutions on capital markets may depend on
various factors.
First, as argued by Vittas (1999),  it may not materialize  until a "critical" mass of
savings has been mobilized.  Second, the impact on the aggregate  supply of long-term
savings may depend on the potential modifications of households'  portfolios.  When
pension contributions are voluntary and mostly realized by wealthy households, the
development of contractual savings may be partly offset by a decrease  in other long-term
savings instruments.  Conversely, mandatory contributions  may have a greater impact on
the supply of long-term savings when households would not save long-term
spontaneously.6 The asset allocation of pension funds and life insurance is also likely to
affect the way capital markets develop.  This may be shaped by features of financial
systems that are more structured  as, for instance, the relative importance of bank and
4 Quoted from Impavido, Musalem and Vittas (2002).
5  Similarly, the use of contractual  savings funds as a captive source of finance by governments may signal a
lack of commitment to sound macro-economic  policies, thus undermining the development  of domestic
financial markets.
6 Baillu and Reisen (1998) explain how aggregate savings can increase when credit constrained borrowers
(indeed, likely to be the poorer individuals) would not be able to re-shuffle their investment portfolios when
mandated to save through a pension scheme beyond what they would do for precautionary  motives.  Indeed,
the literature provides  us with ambiguous results on the impact on household savings derived from the
introduction of mandatory  schemes.  Following the literature, the impact on securities markets that we
want to underline  in this paper does not stem necessarily  from higher savings but from a more efficient
allocation of capital  due to institutionalization.
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stock market finance in the economy.  Next, whether contractual savings development
stimulate further the demand for securities - and in turn  its supply by lowering issuance
costs - will depend on the supervisory  and regulatory mechanisms, fostered by
transparent accounting practices,  among other factors.  Finally, the development of
contractual  savings institutions may have an indirect impact on domestic financial
markets.  For instance it may signal to foreign investors a sound and stable domestic
financial system, hence leading to significant cross-border transactions of securities.7 On
the contrary, the development of domestic financial markets is less stimulated when
contractual  savings invest a larger proportion of their funds abroad.8 Overall, there is a
variety of reasons why one would expect to observe substantial heterogeneity  across
countries experiences,  as indeed it is observed.
H0  MOD3)EL  $1PE2CEICATE()M AEMIC  [E13F1MCAL  STRAT[EGiY
We consider a model in which investors choose to invest in stocks, bonds, money
(currency and non-remunerated  deposits) and quasi-money (e.g.  remunerated  bank
deposits).  At the end of each period t -1, each investor submits a demand for each type
of financial asset for the next period  t.  Individual demands  d,  are aggregated in demand
functions  D,  for each type of asset.  We assume that the supply for each type of financial
asset is fixed.9 Individuals have rational expectations  and their demand functions depend
on a set of factors  including institutional characteristics and expected prices.  Formally,
the demand for each type of asset is given by:
[D,  = F, (Z, lE,l  (P,  E,,
DE,  =F  -1=,  -1(E
EfI(p, ) =  (1)1
where  P, and X, are vectors including,  respectively,  rates of returns and measures  of
risks of financial assets (stocks, bonds, quasi-money,  and non-interest  bearing money).
Agents use current returns and risks to forecast future returns and risks.  Z,,1 is a vector
including institutional  characteristics that affect the financial market, such as the
development of contractual  savings institutions.  If the variables considered have a causal
effect on financial markets, it is natural to include them with one or several  lags and we
use only one lag in our estimations because of the short time dimension of our panels.
GDP per capita is used as a proxy for other institutional aspects that are presumably
strongly correlated with the level of development.  Finally, if contractual  savings exerts a
7 For instance, pension funds hardly invest in stocks in Switzerland,  Malaysia and Singapore, all countries
with  large contractual savings and stock markets.
8 Although restricting the foreign investments of contractual savings for the sole purpose of stimulating the
domestic financial  system  is likely to be counter-productive:  see Impavido, Musalem and Vittas (2002) for
a discussion.
9  This is a reasonable assumption if  the supply varies less than the demand in the short-run.
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causal impact on the depth of securities  markets, it is again natural to include the variable
with lags and in order to maximize the size of the sample, we use only one year lag.
In our regressions we focus on the demand for stocks and bonds, which we estimate in
separate equations.
Given the panel structure of our data, we use a GMM dynamic panel estimator that
corrects for endogeneity of explanatory variables,  time-specific effects and unobserved
country-specific  effects  (in which time invariant  institutional factors  other that
GDP/capita and contractual savings are included).  In each equation we included the lag
dependent variable to allow for endogenous persistence (of stock market capitalization,
stock market liquidity or bond market capitalization).  In turn, this implies that our
analysis is focused on the short-term dynamics of financial markets.  The empirical
specification  is the following:
Y,, = a Y,-,  + 3'P,,, +p'£,,  +  'Z,, 1 + f, + d, + E,,  (2)
where  Y1,  is either stock market capitalization relative to GDP, stock market value traded
relative to GDP or bond market capitalization  relative to GDP;  P,, is a vector including
the real returns on stocks, debt and non-interest bearing money;  £,, is a vector including
the risk measures for the three types of financial assets;  Z,,  includes observed
institutional  features such as the relative size of contractual  savings and the level of
economic development;  f, captures all unobserved country-specific fixed effects and all
country-specific time-invariant variables;  d,  is a full set of year dummies;  Ej,  is the error
term which is assumed not to be correlated  across countries and not auto-correlated.
We use the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimatorl0 which amounts to
implementing the following steps.  First, the equation  is first-differenced  in order to
eliminate the country-specific  fixed effect (which is  likely to be correlated with the
explanatory variables):
AY,  =aAY,,_,  ,  AP,  +pA,,  + 4'AZ,,,  + Ad,  + As,,  (3)
Next, instruments are used in order to deal with the likely endogeneity of explanatory
variables and non-orthogonality  between error term and regressors  in (3).11  Assuming
that the error term in (2) is not serially correlated, the following moment conditions apply
to the lag dependent variable  and the set of explanatory  Y,,  variables  X = (P,£,Z):
10  We do not use the GMM system estimator developed  by  Arellano and Bover (1995) for the following
reason. Moment conditions for the system estimator  are based  on the assumption that lags of the first
difference of the dependent variable and explanatory variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effectsf .In
the context of our paper, this means that changes in  securities  markets'  depth and liquidity, and changes in
contractual savings size are uncorrelated with slow-moving country specific factors, such  as past policy
choices ( notably the decision to develop a funded pension system, with mandatory or voluntary
contributions  prior to the period studied), demographic structures, etc. This is obviously incompatible with
the argument and results of the paper.
" Results confirm that the assumption of no serial correlation  of error terms in  the level equation is  valid.
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E[Y;,,  (E  /,-  A=0  for  s0  2
E[XI,s  (s,,  - j,,,-A  = 0 for s 2 2
We present only first step estimates, corrected for heteroschedasticity,  which are
reported by Arellano and Bond (1991) to be the most reliable.1 2
The data on contractual savings institutions used in this paper has been already used in
earlier papers by the same authors.  It includes information from different sources 3 on
total financial  assets, and allocation of assets for a subset of  countries.  Other
macroeconomic  variables are obtained from various sources:  Datastreamn for stock market
index, the World Development Indicators, the IM1  International Financial  Statistics, the
Bank for International Settlement for bond markets data, and various papers (Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (1999) and La Porta et al. (1996)).
DG.[.3.2  1  iDafl  on  n  oOf?  0qV&Aib
We want to assess the impact of contractual  savings institutions portfolios'  on securities
market depth and liquidity.  We consider the following dependent variables: a) stock
market depth is proxied by stock market capitalization over GDP, b) stock market
liquidity is proxied by stock value traded over GDP, c) bond market depth is defined as
the value of total bonds outstanding (public and private) over GDP.  All financial
variables are measured at the end of the year.
We control for real rates of returns  and risks for three groups of assets.  First, the real
rate of return on non-interest  bearing money is defined by: {[l/(l+inflation rate)] - 1}.
Second, the real rate of return on quasi money is proxied by the real interest rate on
deposits'4 and defined by: {[(I+  iD)/(l+inflation rate)]-1 }.  Third, the real rate of return
on stocks uses the annual rate of growth of earnings for the Datastream index and defined
by: {[(1+rate of change of the stock price index +dividends)/(l+inflation  rate)]-l }.
Fourth, the risk measure is computed, for each real rate of return, as the ratio of  the
within year standard deviation to the mean of the real rate of return considered.'5
We also control for GDP per capita, defined in constant dollar, as a proxy for the
overall level of  development of the country considered.
12  The one-step estimator produces consistent standard errors, but does not yield heteroschedasticity-
consistent coefficients when the dependent variable does not follow an AR(1) process with a close to unity
coefficient.  In our regressions  we correct for heteroschedasticity.
13 Including data from the OECD Institutional Investors Statistical Yearbook 2000 for OECD countries, and
national sources for other countries.
14 The nominal deposit interest rate was chosen as the variable larger country coverage.  As shown in Table
3, this choice yields a negative (albeit very small) average real interest rate in countries like Austria and
Ireland; and a rather high  negative average  real interest in Turkey.
"Computed  from  monthly data.
-7  -The Impact Of Contractual  Savings Institutions  On Securities Markets
The aim is to assess whether the institutionalization of savings has an impact on the
development of domestic  securities market.
Testing for economic causality  is not an easy task in a panel data framework  in which
the time dimension is short (6 years per country on average).  In particular,  one could
argue that the long-run dynamics of economies, that includes  stock markets, bond
markets  and contractual savings institutions,  are all determined  by other, slow moving,
factors such as the legal framework, the overall level of development,  the level of
education, the demographic  structure, et cetera.
The different results presented and the methodology chosen in this paper suggest that
such long-term joint determination of both financial markets and contractual savings
institutions may not explain the strong correlation between the short-term dynamics of
financial markets and contractual  savings institutions over the  1990s.
Several  sources of bias are controlled for.
As already explained,  the choice of using the lag contractual savings variable rather
than the contemporaneous one is natural if contractual savings are to have a causal  impact
on the dynamics of stock and bond markets.
Next, the GMM procedure allows to control for the fact that the size of contractual
savings is likely to be correlated to the error term that captures country-year  specific
shocks affecting stock or bond markets.
The correlation between contractual savings and securities market development may
simply be the consequence of price movements.  As contractual  savings'  financial assets
are measured at their market values, there exists a priori  a strong correlation between the
stock and bond market variables  and contractual savings financial assets.  Hence,
contractual  savings financial assets over GDP may not be an appropriate variable.  Note
that we do want to explain stock and bond markets depth (e.g., variables in nominal terms
scaled by GDP).  In particular, we do want to analyze whether the development of
contractual  savings leads to an increase  in the demand for securities (hence their prices'6)
relative to GDP.  Thus, this price effect has to be embodied in the dependent variable.
However, the econometric relationship between the development of contractual  savings
and financial markets depth and liquidity should rot be the result of such a price effect.
For this purpose,  we define contractual  savings as the share of contractual  savings
financial assets over total financial assets (i.e., stock market capitalization plus the value
of total bond outstanding plus M2).  This variable captures the importance of institutional
savings relative to total financial assets in the economy.'7
The definition of the variables  used in the paper can be found in Table 1.
Thus we are implicitly assuming that the supply of securities  does not change  significantly relative to the
demand.
7 Note that the impact of price movements on the correlation between the dependent  variable and the
contractual savings variable  is not obvious.  If  the asset composition of contractual savings is similar to the
economy portfolio, then price changes will not affect the independent variable but will affect the dependent
variable.  If stocks have a higher weight in contractual savings than in the economy portfolio then a price
increase will increase both independent as well as dependent variables,  so we get a positive result.  Finally,
if stocks have a lower weight in contractual savings than in the economy portfolio then a price increase will
lower the independent  variable but will increase the dependent variable.
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M0  [EMPHuRCAEL RESUILTS
§§§oA DescripU  $X2egic$
Table 2 provides  a classification of countries used in our regressions  according to several
dummies  indicating whether countries have bank or market based financial systems, high
or low capital account openness,  and voluntary or mandatory pension systems.18
Table 3 presents the sample of countries that are included  in the first general regression
in Table 6.  It includes developed  OECD countries and also several emerging economies
(e.g.  Argentina, Chile, Hungary, Malaysia, Poland, South Africa and Turkey).  We use
the information of total financial assets held by contractual  savings in these economies.'9
In the econometric analysis, we have on average  6 consecutive  years of observation per
country.
As described in previous papers,20 contractual savings  financial assets have  increased at
a rapid pace in many countries over the 90s.  Contractual savings financial assets, relative
to GDP, have been growing at an average annual rate of 17.7%, 3.4%, 6.9%, 6%, 7.9%
and 9%, respectively  in France, Germany, South Africa, the United States, the United
Kingdom and Chile.  Expressed relative to total financial assets in the economy, the
respective average annual rates of growth are 13.5%, -1.0%, 8.9%,  1.8%, 1.7%  and 3.5%.
A shown by Impavido and Musalem (2000), this development has been similar, in term
of growth, to the development of capital markets, and may partly explain this evolution.
Stock market capitalization  (relative to GDP) has been growing for the same countries
respectively at 3.3%, 8.0%, 8.9%,  10.1%, 5.9%  and 3.6% annually on average,  and bond
market capitalization (relative to GDP) respectively at 3.1%, 3.6%, -8.0%, 2.4%, 5.5%
and 8%.  Stock markets have become more liquid in all countries, except Germany:  stock
value traded (relative to GDP) has been growing for France, Germany,  South Africa, the
United States, the United Kingdom and Chile respectively at 12.9%, -0.1%, 20.7%,
16.6%,  6.8% and  15.1% annually  on average.
Statistics based solely on the cross-country  dimension give a similar flavor.  In
countries with the highest proportion of financial assets held by contractual  savings21
(44.4% of total financial assets on average over the period),  stock market capitalization,
stock value traded and bond market capitalization are respectively on average  125.7%,
64.0% and 43.7% of GDP.  In countries with the lowest proportion of financial assets
held by contractual  savings22 (5.7% of total financial assets on average over the period),
the same figures are 22.2%, 63.4% and 14.5%, respectively.  Hence, financial assets held
by contractual savings seem to explain relatively well the cross-country differences  of
18 The index of voluntary or mandatory pension systems is constructed using OECD (2002).
9 For Argentina,  we use only financial  assets held by pension funds.  Dropping these two countries, or
including financial  assets held by the insurance industry (we do not have the break up between life and
non-life insurance),  does not affect the results.  For Poland, we have only the information for life insurance;
dropping the country does not affect the result.
20See  for instance Impavido  and Musalem (2000)  and Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2002a and 2002b).
21 Countries are: Iceland,  Ireland, Netherlands,  Singapore, South Africa, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom.
22 Greece, Hungary,  Italy, Mexico,  Portugal, Spain and Turkey.
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stock market capitalization  and liquidity, while they seem to be less correlated with bond
market capitalization  in our data.2
Table 4 and Table 5 report simple correlations between various variables based on the
sample of the first general regression in Table 6. CSFA is indeed positively correlated
with stock market capitalization and stock value traded, at a 5%  significance level, while
the positive correlation  with bond market capitalization  is not significant.  As expected,
CSFA is significantly  larger in more developed  economies.  Furthermore, volatility on
stock market returns is significantly lower when contractual savings are more developed,
which suggests that contractual savings development may be associated with a less
volatile environment for investors.  Stock market returns are also more volatile in more
inflationary environments, which is consistent with the view that higher inflation may be
associated with higher economic uncertainty.  Finally, there does not seem to be a
significant correlation,  on a cross country basis, between the size of contractual savings
and whether pension  contributions are mandatory or voluntary,  and also the importance
of capital account transactions in securities.
These simple statistics suggest that there is a close relationship between the proportion
of financial assets held by contractual savings and the depth and liquidity of financial
markets.  The econometric analysis  in the next section further studies the impact of
contractual  savings  development on financial markets.
Ill.B Regression Results
Table 6 reports regression results for a) domestic stock market capitalization,  b) domestic
stock value traded, and c) domestic bond market capitalization.  The GMM estimator that
we use, in the context of a dynamic panel, implies that our focus is on the short-term
dynamic of the dependent variable.  In each equation, there is a strong persistence of the
dependent variable as shown by the strongly significant coefficient on its lag value.  Tests
on the residuals support the specification and  instruments chosen, as they imply that they
are not serially correlated24. The results support the hypothesis that the increased
importance of contractual  savings,  as a proportion of total financial assets, is associated
with an increase  in stock market capitalization and an increase  in bond market
capitalization.  The impact is economically  large in both cases.  For instance,  it implies
that a 1% point increase  in the share of contractual  savings in total financial assets leads
to  1.89% point increase in stock market capitalization  (relative to GDP, which proxies for
real income) at the next period, after controlling for various factors - including current
stock market capitalization.  However,  there does not seem to be an impact on stock
market liquidity, proxied by stock value traded,25 when countries are not differentiated.26
23 The statistics reported are calculated over the sarnple used in  the first regression of Table 6.
24 In addition,  the Sargan test does not reject the over-identification  restrictions at the 5%  level. We report
Sargan tests based on the first step estimates. Note that Arellano  and Bond (1991)  show that the Sargan test
based on the first step estimates understates the probability of accepting the over-identification restriction
in presence of heteroschedasticity.
25  We performed the same analysis with the tumover ratio (stock value traded over stock market
capitalization)  instead of stock value traded over GDP.  The results are broadly similar.  However, the
assumption of no serial correlation  in the residual was systematically  rejected, and as we did not obtain a
satisfactory  specification,  we chose not to report these regressions.
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Control variables are mildly significant.  The coefficient on inflation is usually positive
and at least weakly significant in all the specifications  in the stock market capitalization
and stock value traded regressions.  This is because an acceleration  in inflation promotes
a flight from nominal financial assets (e.g., non-interest bearing money) into real
financial assets (stocks).  Other studies tend to find a negative impact of inflation on
stock market development (for instance Boyd, Levine and Smith (2001)); however, they
usually do not include a measure of inflation volatility; as these two variables tend to be
strongly correlated  (e.g., volatility is higher for higher levels of inflation), this may
explain our contrasting  results.27 As expected,  the index of stock market real return is
positively associated with both stock market dependent variables.  Inflation volatility has
a negative impact on stock market depth but not on stock market liquidity.  Per capita
GDP is rarely significant.28 Bond market depth is positively associated with the real
interest rate and the real interest rate volatility variables.  While the effect of the real
interest rate is intuitive, the impact of volatility of the real interest rate seems counter-
intuitive.  The volatility of the short term real interest rate should (in principle)  be
negatively  related to demand.  However,  a plausible explanation for this seemingly
contradictory  result relates to the demand for different bond maturities, adjustable interest
rates or indexed instruments that investors have.  In fact, volatility of the short term real
interest rate is likely to promote the demand for long term instruments immune to short
term volatility:  namely, adjustable rate and indexed bonds.  Unfortunately,  we do not
have (both) the long term (and short term interest) rate and we cannot distinguish among
the demands for different maturities along the yield curve and immune instruments.  We
have shown that stock market and bond market capitalization significantly increase
following an increase in contractual  savings financial assets as a proportion of total
financial assets.
However, it is likely that the impact of contractual savings may differ according to
various structural characteristics of the economies (such as the relative importance of
banks versus stock markets, as shown  in Impavido, Musalem and Tressel (2002a)).  In
the next part of the paper, we explore possible sources of heterogeneity across countries.
Table 2 provides the break-up of the countries according to each characteristic  considered.
In Table 7 we explore whether the economy has a bank-based or market-based
financial system (see the classification defined by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999))
modifies the mechanisms through which contractual  savings affect the financial system.
As shown in Impavido,  Musalem and Tressel (2002a), the asset allocation  of contractual
savings  is noticeably different in the two groups of countries:  in market based economies,
contractual  savings institutions hold 30.7% of their financial assets in equity, 42.6% of
bills and bonds and 13.9% in loans; in bank-based economies,  the same figures are
respectively  12.3%, 45% and 31.6%.  The institutionalization  of savings by pension funds
and life insurance companies  is also more developed in market-based economies, in
2  In interpreting the magnitude of the impact on securities markets we are of course aware of the
limitations imposed by the assumption of slope homogeneity.
27Boyd,  Levine and Smith (2001) analyze  in detail the impact of inflation on the financial system.  In
particular,  they find a non-monotonic effect on inflation.
28  This implies only that the level of development does not explain the short-run dynamic of the financial
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which financial assets held by contractual savings represents 27% of total financial assets
versus 19% in bank-based economies.29
As suggested by these figures, the development of contractual savings  institutions has a
significant impact on the development of the stock market only in countries with a
market-based financial system.  In contrast, the development of contractual savings
seems to stimulate the bond market more in countries with a bank-based financial system.
These results are consistent with those  obtained in Impavido, Musalem and Tressel
(2002a) concerning  firms'  financing patterns.
In Table  8, countries are grouped according to whether pension funds contributions  are
mandatory or voluntary.  In several countries, both systems coexist; for this reason, we
defined two classifications by allocating these countries  in one of the two sub-groups,  so
that we obtain the two extreme classifications.
There are two reasons for using this feature of pension funds to classify the countries.
The first reason  is that we expect that when contributions are voluntary, households may
simply substitute different savings instruments with similar maturities (including
securities),  according to the expected after tax returns.  This would be the case for
relatively wealthy  households3 . Conversely, when contributions  are mandatory, it is
more likely that less wealthy households will be forced to hold more long-term savings
than they would otherwise do.  Hence, the aggregate supply of long-term savings is likely
to increase by a larger amount in countries with mandatory pension contributions than in
countries with voluntary pension contributions when contractual  savings develop because
the reallocation of households portfolios to balance their pension contributions will be
more limited.31 The second reason is that the use of this classification  is likely to reduce
the possible reverse causality and endogeneity problem.  When pension contributions  are
mandatory,  it is less likely that an increase in contractual  savings size is only due to
realized (or expected)  increases  in stock market returns.  More generally, the decision to
design a pension fund system with mandatory  or voluntary  contributions is a political
decision that is relatively exogenous to the economic environment.
Interestingly, we find strong support for the hypothesis that contractual  savings
development has a significant impact on stock market depth and liquidity in economies  in
which pension contributions are mandatory while  it is weaker  in countries  in which
contributions  are voluntary.  These results are consistent with a causal effect from
contractual  savings  development to stock market development.  We do not obtain any
clear results for the bond market.
In Table 9 we control for international transactions  in securities.  Countries are grouped
according to the importance of transactions in securities either realized abroad by
domestic investors or realized domestically by foreign investors (see Table  1 for the
precise' definition of the variable).  Ideally,  we would like to control for two separate
issues.  First, foreign investors do buy and sell domestic securities.  The development of
contractual  savings may indirectly stimulate the development of domestic financial
markets  by signaling a sound financial system, hence  attracting foreign capital.  Second,
29  The statistics just reported are drawn from the full samnple at our disposition.
30 For instance  because of fixed transaction  costs to buy/sell securities.
31  See Baillu and Reisen (1998) for a similar argument.
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contractual  savings do invest abroad,  hence their impact on the domestic financial system
may be reduced.  These two mechanisms  are likely to work in opposite directions:  in the
first case, one expects  that the impact of contractual savings on financial market
development is stronger when international  transactions are higher.  In the second case,
the impact of contractual savings on the domestic financial system will be weaker the
more they invest abroad.  Unfortunately, we do not have enough information to identify
each mechanism precisely.
The contractual savings variable is interacted with a dummy variable for each country
subgroup, and the variable for capital account openness  is also included.  Note that this
variable is significant only in the stock market capitalization equation; the stock market is
larger in countries that are more open to capital flows (at least for securities); this result is
more consistent with the first mechanism.  However, the interaction term with the
contractual  savings variable yields mixed results.  The impact on market depth is
significant only for the stock market capitalization when capital flows are relatively  low,
while the opposite result in terms of openness is obtained for bond market capitalization.
This could be expected  given the discussion above.
Table  10 uses a different approach to tackle country heterogeneity.  The contractual
savings variable is interacted with an index for the quality of accounting  standard, a
proxy for the transparency  on the securities market supposedly positively related to
market corporate governance  mechanisms.32 The regressions results support the view
that contractual savings  institutions may foster the development of stock markets by
increasing transparency:  the impact on the development of the stock market is indeed
higher in countries where accounting standards are well developed, as indeed such an
environment  is necessary for contractual savings to be able to enhance transparency and
33 market governance mechanisms
In Table  11, we want to make a first step in addressing the causality  issue.  One of the
challenges of empirical economics  in the context of panel data with short time series is to
disentangle  the causality between two variables X and Y.  The question is: does X cause
Y, or vice-versa,  or are X and Y jointly determined  by exogenous "initial conditions" that
generate the whole path of development of the economic system considered?  More
specifically,  the question here is whether the development of contractual  savings has a
causal impact on financial markets, or whether financial markets and contractual savings
institutions are both symptoms of a better functioning financial system and economy in
general.  In the former case, a significantly different from zero coefficient in front of the
lag contractual savings would indicate causality from contractual  savings yesterday to
market development today.  In the latter case, the lag contractual savings  variable might
have a positive and significant impact on financial markets simply because of their joint
determination.
32  See La Porta et al. (1996).
33 Notice that in Table 10 we use as regressors  both the lag contractual savings variable and the interaction
of the contractual savings variable with an index for the quality of accounting standard.  Contrary to other
tables in which the contractual savings variable is interacted with dummies, the exercise here is to test
whether the impact of contractual savings on the dependent variable increases (decreases) with the quality
of accounting standards. By keeping the lag of contractual savings  in the regression we assume an intercept
different from zero  in this linear relationship.
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First, note that the GMM technique that we use shall in principle correct for various
sources of bias, such as endogeneity (that would for instance result from a joint
determination of both contractual savings and financial markets variables),  and
measurement  errors.  Second, the common factors that may jointly determine our
dependent and explanatory  variable are likely to be slow-moving  factors (e.g.  factors that
perform better at explaining  cross-country differences than at explaining within country
evolution over the short or medium term; for instance:  education, legal factors, openness
to trade, demographic structure, et cetera. Hence,  it may be difficult to test for their
impact on the dynamics of the dependent variables (and also the contractual savings
variable).  One possibility is to include such slow-moving factors in the differenced
equation, hence testing whether their level has an impact on the differenced dependent
variable.  We performed  such a test for the following variables: accounting standards,  law
origin (common law, civil law), secondary  education, rate of growth of population and
trade openness.  They turned out to be non-significant and do not affect the results
substantially, so we do not report these regressions.34
The next step is to decompose the contractual  savings variable  into an "endogenous"
component explained by the set of variables capturing the country characteristics  (e.g., a
fitted value of a regression of the contractual savings variable on this set of slow-moving
factors + lag dependent variable), and an "exogenous"  component (e.g.  the difference
between the variable and the fitted value).  Using the same estimation technique
(difference  GMM), we regress the contractual savings variable on the following lag
explanatory variables  (plus the lag contractual  savings variable):  a) percentage of
population aged more than 64 years, b) rate of growth of population, c) secondary
education, d) trade openness, e) rate of growth of per capita GDP, f) per capita GDP, and
g) legal indicators  + accounting standards + ownership concentration  variable35.36
The two components  are then used as explanatory variables  in the three regressions.
Note that the "exogenous" component  includes both country time-invariants  effects37 and
the residuals that are not serially correlated,38 but could have different variance,  across
countries.  This component picks up all that is not predicted by the explanatory  variables.
To us, it means that it embodies the aspects of the dynamics of contractual  savings caused
by other variables, that are truly exogenous to the structure of the economy, such as the
existence (or not) of tax incentives (as in France for life insurance), whether pension
contributions are mandatory or voluntary,  the decision to undertake a pension reform  or
not, the regulations affecting the allocation of assets, in short all discretionary policies39
that favor (or not) the institutionalization of savings.40 This  is a preliminary  assessment.
However,  the results support the view that this "exogenous"  component has an impact on
34  Our understanding  is that the effect of such slow-moving factors are probably picked up by the lag
dependent variable.
35  The ownership concentration variable  is from La Porta et al. (1996). It is computed as the average
percentage  of common shares owned by the three largest shareholders  in the ten largest non-financial
domestic firms.
36  These last variables  are included in levels in the differenced equation.
37 As they are not estimated in the differenced  equation.
38  The tests indeed reject the presence of serial correlation of the residuals  in (3).
39 In the sense that they truly depend on an exogenous political decision.
40 See Vittas (2002) for policies that promote retirement savings.
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the dynamics of stock and bond markets capitalization, while there is no impact on stock
market liquidity.
W  CYOCLUNOM
We have explored the impact of contractual savings institutions on the development  of
domestic securities markets.  This work complements  the existing research on this issue.
We show that the institutionalization of savings, as measured by the proportion of
financial assets in the economy held by contractual savings  institutions, has an impact on
the short-term dynamics of securities markets: it increases the depth of stock and bond
markets and in some cases increases the stock market liquidity.  The impact on the stock
market is stronger in countries with a market based financial system and/or countries with
mandatory pension contributions,  while the impact on the bond market is stronger in
countries with a bank based financial  system.  The link between contractual  savings and
stock market is however weaker the larger the cross-border securities transactions are.
Next, the use of transparent market-based corporate governance mechanisms  tend to
complement the impact of contractual  savings on the stock market.  Finally, the analysis
suggests that the results are not the consequence of a joint determination of both
contractual  savings  institutions and financial markets by other slow-moving
characteristics of the economies.  Policies shaping the institutionalization of savings do
matter.
[1]  Aireallno,  M., and S.  Boind (1991) Some Tests of Specifications  for Panel Data:
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations, Review of
Economic Studies, 58, p.227-297.
[2]  Arellano, M. and 0. Bover (1995)  Another Look at the Instrumental Variable
Estimation of Error-Component  Models, Journal  of  Econometrics, 68, 29-52.
[3]  BalnRu,  J., and E. Reisen (1998)  Do funded pensions contribute to higher aggregate
savings?  A cross country analysis.  Ageing Working Paper AWP 5.1.  Paris: OECD.
[4]  IBeek, TI.,  and R.  Levine (2002) Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel
Evidence.  NBER Working Paper  9082.
[5]  Blommnestein,  HE.  (2001) Ageing, Pension Reform, and Financial Market
Implications  in the OECD Area.  CeRP Working Paper  9/01.
[6]  BlRommesteinm,  lHt., and N.  IFunke (eds.) (1998) Institutional  Investors in the New
Financial  Landscape. (OECD, Paris).
[7]  MBlundell,  R., and S. Bond (1998) Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions  in
Dynamic Panel Data Models. Journal  of  Econometrics 87:  115-43.
[8]  Bossome,  B3., Mahnan  S., and  F.  Zahir (2002) Financial Infrastructure,  Group
Interests, and Capital Accumulation.  IF  Staff Working Paper. Forthcoming.
[9]  IBoyd, J.  HEt.,  Ross L., and Smith,  lB. ID).  (2001) The impact of inflation on financial
sector performance.  Journal  of  Monetary Economics, April, 47(2), 221-248.
- 15 -The Impact Of Contractual Savings Institutions On Securities Markets
[10]  Catalan, M., Impavido G., and A. R.  Musalem  (2000) Contractual  Savings or
Stock Market Development: Which Leads? Journal  of  Applied Social Science
Studies, 120(3): 445-87.  Paper can also be downloaded from the World Bank
Pension Primer Series at http://www.worldbank.orgZpensions
[11]  Davis,  P., and B.  Steil (2001) Institutional  Investors.  (Cambridge,  Mass.  : MIT
Press, 2001).
[12]  Demirguc-Kunt, A.,  and R.  Levine (1999) Bank-based and Market-Based
Financial Systems: Cross-Country  Comparisons, World Bank Policy  Research
Paper  2143.
[13]  Impavido, G., and A.R.  Musalem  (2000) Contractual  Savings, Stock and Asset
Markets,  World Bank Policy Research Paper  2490.
[14]  Impavido, G., Musalem,  A.R., and D.  Vittas (2002) Contractual Savings in
Countries with a Small Financial  System.  In James Hanson, Patrick Honohan, and
Giovanni Majnoni eds.: Globalization  and Financial  Systems in Small Developing
Countries, (World Bank).
[15] Impavido, G., Musalem,  A.R., and T.  Tressel (2002a) Contractual Savings,
Capital Markets, and Firms' Financing Choices, In Devarajan S. and F.  H.  Rogers
eds.:  World Bank Economist'Forum. Volume II.  (World Bank).
[16]  Impavido, G., Musalem,  A.R., and T.  Tressel (2002b)  Contractual Savings
Institutions and Banks' Stability and Efficiency,  World Bank Policy Research  Paper
2751.
[17]  La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes,  F., Shleifer, A.,  and R.  Vishny (1996) Law and
Finance".  NBER Working Paper  5661.
[18]  Levine, R.  (1999) Banks, Markets, and Structure: Implications and Determinants"
in Burki, Shahid Javed;  Perry, Guillermo E., eds.: Banks and capital  markets: Sound
Financial  Systems for the 215' century.  Annual World Bank Conference on
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean.
[19]  OECD (2002) Revised Taxonomy for Pension Plans, Pension Funds an Pension
Entities. Working Party on Private Pensions DAFFE/AS/PEN/WD(2001)5/REV3.
[20]  Poterba, J. M., and A.  A.  Samwick (1995)  Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock
Market Fluctuations, and Consumptions.  Brookings Papers  on Economic Activity,
2.
[21]  Reisen,  H.  (2000) Pensions, Savings And Capital  Flow. Edward Elgar Publishing
[22]  Vittas, D.  (1999) Pension Reform and Financial Markets, Harvard  Institutefor
International  Development, Development Discussion Paper  697.
[23]  Vittas, D.  (2002) Policies to Promote Saving for Retirement - A Synthetic
Overview,  World Bank Policy Research Paper  2801.
- 16-Gregorio Impavido, Alberto R.  Musalem and Thierry Tressel
Tra0ae 1:  D0eflnDtoid  n  offVairnallnez
VARIABLE  DEFINITION
Contractual Savings Financial Assets Share  Pension funds +  life Insurenca financial  assets over
stock merket capitalization plus total bond outstanding plus M2 /1
Stock Market Depth  Stock market capitaltzabon over GDP /1
Stock Market Uquidity  Stock value traded over GDP
Bond Market  Depth  Total  bond outstanding over GDP /1
Inflabon Rate  Consumer price annual inflation rate
Real  Interest Rate  (1 +nominal interest ratey(l +inflation  rate)-1
Real Rate of Retum  on Stock Market  (1+rate of change of the stock price index+dividends)/(1+inflaton  rate).l1
Inflation Rate Volatility  Standard deviation over mean (Inflaton) computed from monthly data
Real Interest Rate Volatility  Standard deviabon over mean (real interest rate) computed from  monthly data
Real Stock Market Retum Volatility  Standard  deviabon over mean  (real return  index) computed from monthly data
GDP/capita  GDP in constant dollar over total population
BANK  Bank-based financfal  systems,  eourra Drnirguc-Kunr  end Lele (1999)
MKT  Market-based financal systems,  courre Dernrrgu-Kunt  ed LoAne  (1999)
Mandat  Mandatory pension contnbutions
Volunt  Voluntary pension contnbutions
Capital Account Portfolio Openness  Sum of absolute value of Portfolio Foreign  Investment Assets (IFS line  78bfd)
plus Portfolio Foreign  Investment Liabilites (IFS lIne  78 bod)  over GDP
High  Countnes with Capital Account Portfolio Openness > median
LoW  Countries with Capital Account Portfolio Openness c median
Accounting Standard  Index of accounting practises
scurce  La  Parst,  Lopez da Stones &  VJshny (1998)
Notes:  /1 At the end of the year.
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Table 2: Sample Classification
Country  Market  High  Low
Country  Bank based  Mbarkedt  Mandatoryl  Voluntaryl  Mandatory2  Voluntary2  Foreign  Foreign
Sec.  Sec.
Argentina  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0
Australia  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  0
Austria  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1
Belgium  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1
Canada  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0
Chile  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1
Denmark  0  1  1  0  0  1  1  0
Finland  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0
France  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0
Germany  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0
Grnece  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1
Hungary  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  1
Iceland  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  1
Ireland  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0
Italy  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0
Japan  1  0  1  0  0  1  1  0
Korea,  Rep.  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1
Malaysia  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1
Mexico  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1
Netherlands  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0
New Zealand  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1
Norway  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0
Poland  1  0  1  0  0  1  0  1
Portugal  1  0  0  1  0  1  1  0
Singapore  0  1  1  0  1  0  0  1
South Atrica  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1
Spain  1  0  0  1  0  1  0  1
Sweden  0  1  1  0  0  1  0  1
Switzerland  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0
Turkey  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1
United Kingdom  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0
United States  0  1  0  1  0  1  1  0
Note: As far as the mandatory  and voluntary  classifications are concerned,  countries are grouped  accordmg to whether
pension funds contributions are mandatory  or voluntary.  In several countries, both systems coexist; for this reason, we
defined two other indicators by allocating these countries in one of  the two sub-groups, so that we obtain the two
extreme  classifications.
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Table 3: In-Sample Countuy Means of SeReof  VaHrablRes
RwalInt  Real MLkt
County  CSFA  Bond M.  kt  Stock M.  kt  Stock Trd  Inflation  mro  Retum
%  %  GDP  %  GDP  %  GDP  %  %  %
Argentina  3.87  8.45  16.59  4.69  1.35  7.28  14 97
Australia  29.83  47.02  84.87  35.24  3.21  4.42  12.11
Austra  11.00  60.69  14.80  7.77  2.77  -0.17  0.62
Belgium  8.97  156.75  39.47  6.43  2.42  2.53  8.21
Canada  28.77  85.93  63.42  31.19  2.41  4.19  11.70
Chile  25.17  44.85  103.39  10.37  11.87  3.91  29.25
Denmark  19.31  160.03  35.24  15.94  2.10  3.08  11.94
Finland  27.47  60.90  33.82  12.83  2.35  2 35  21.94
France  14.37  78.19  35.26  18.09  2.21  2.02  9.06
Germany  13.16  79.23  27.81  28.78  2.89  1.74  13.53
Greece  8.68  75.34  18.52  7.57  11.67  5.23  2.08
Ireland  46.95  43.28  17.32  6.58  2.51  -2.03  27.92
Italy  4.64  127.56  18.79  9.05  4.45  1.97  12.81
Korea,  Rep.  18.90  43.85  33.98  45.88  6.12  3.00  -8.65
Malaysia  15.36  70.70  225.99  118.44  3.82  3.09  26.16
Netherlands  56.75  73.54  78.02  46.70  2.54  1.02  17.26
New Zealand  12.21  26.79  140.13  38.17  1.73  6.04  127.64
Norway  22.51  43.03  28 02  14.61  2.48  4.09  15.15
Poland  1.75  18.42  8.95  5.88  18.03  1.43  24.94
Portugal  6.84  54.69  22.32  8.57  5.01  3.67  22.17
Singapore  36.31  58.87  152.95  72.49  2.46  1.00  3.63
South Africa  37.05  76.57  164.33  15.25  10.85  3.38  6.76
Spain  8.63  57.34  33.40  25.17  4.76  3 28  17.52
Sweden  17.99  109.72  70.37  37.01  4.03  1.78  16.63
Switzerland  35.37  76.05  125.87  92.33  3.16  1.25  12.80
Turkey  0.28  11.98  16.42  17.44  77.86  -3.78  34.87
United  KIngdom  46.37  50.18  122.87  45.54  4.01  1.98  11.71
Unted  States  28.31  147.04  94.14  68.30  3.29  1.80  15.64
Notes: Averages are calculated over the sample used in the furst regression in Table 6.  /l  Pension funds only; /2 Life
insurance only.
- 19-FL F  L 
1  6  6  6  66 
6f  6
6  b  6  o
0  P  P
a  0 P 0 . 3  io  |  |  E  20  or
t-  84  xm 8  t0Gregorio Impavido, Alberto R.  Musalem and Thierry Tressel
T2ble 50  l1m-$imile CorrelaRidoo  2
Contr.  P~~~~~~~~~~~~~~eal  Stock  Real Interest  Real Stock Conbr.  Domestic  Stock Market  Stock  Inflation  Real  Interest  Inflation  Rate  Market  Per Capita
Savings Size  Bond Size  Cap.  Traded  Rate  Return  Rery)  nate  Retm  GDP MRketu  (omtliy  (volatility)  (volatility)
Contr.  Savings Size  1.0000
Domestic Bond  Seze  -0.0387  1.0000
0.8304
Stock Market Cap.  0 5134-  -0 0018  1.0000
0 OO  0  9820
Stock Traded  0 3125°  0 0261  0.7381t  1.0000
0 0001  0 7428  0  OO
Inflafion  -0 3333  -0.362r  -0.1686-  -0.1242  1 0000
0 0000  0 0000  00 326  01166
Real Interest Rate  0.0366  0.0133  0.0094  -0.1460  -0.5129'  1.0000
0 6492  08674  09054  00640  0 0000
Real Stock Market Retum  -0.0748  -0.0411  0.1346  0.1338  0.0406  0.0087  1.0000
0 353  0 605  0 0898  00915  0 6099  0 9333
Inflation (volatility)  0.0182  0.0275  0.0706  0.1112  -0.0715  0.0442  0.0045  1.0000
0 8209  0 7290  03732  01603  0 3676  R5776  09516
Real  Interest Rate (volatility)  -0.0007  0 0837  0.0200  0.0905  0 0167  -0.0931  0 0517  0.0047  1 0000
0 9927  0 2914  0 8008  02538  0 8333  0 240  04869  0 9494
Real Stock Market  Retum  (volafility)  -0 3014-  402913  -00886  0.0472  0.4898  -0.1794  0.4426  -0.0887  0.0198  1.0000
0 o00  0 0002  0 263  0 5521  00000  00227  00000  0 2312  0 7900
Per Capita GDP  0.2859-  0.4194  -0.0441  0.1932  -0.3803°  -0.1099  -0 0355  0 0824  0.1282  -0.1821-  1.0000
00003  00000  05783  00141  00000  01651  06545  02985  01052  00208
Notes: Statistics calculated over sample used in the first regression in Table 6.  P-values  in italics.  °  5% significance level.
- 21 -The Impact Of Contractual  Savings Institutions  On Securities Markets
Table 6: Impact of Contractual Savings on Capital Markets
First difference dynamic panel data GMM estimator
Dependent Variable:  Stock Market Capitalization  Stock Traded  Total Domestic  Bonds
(%  GDP)  (%  GDP)  (%  GDP)
Explanatory Variables
(lagged)
Lagged dependent variable  0 74  0 63-  0.62
7.45  4.5  3 68
CS financial assets share  1.89  0.36  0.40~
2 41  042  2.91
Inflation  0.6  0.53'  -0.04
1  24  1 67  -0 27
Real Interest Rate  -0.52  -0 82  0 48
-0 55  -1  13  1.59
Real Retum on Stock Market Index  0.13'  0.13*  -0.01034
1  73  1 85  -0  39
Inflation (volatility)  -0 035  -0.002  -8 7E-05
-4.26  -0 39  -0 05
Real Interest Rate (volatility)  1.19E-05  0 004  0 0019-
0  1 46  218
Real Stock Market Retum (volatility)  -1.39  -0 78  0 29
-1.93  -148  1 4
GDP/capita (constant US $)  7.32E-06  2.71E-06  -4.09E-06
1  19  0 49  -1.45
Number of Obs.  161  160  161
Number of Groups  28  28  28
Wald Test  2922.12  1729.27  341.02
(joint significance)  15  15  15
Test of autocorrelation  of order 1  -2.3  -1 69  -2.62
0021  0 090  0 009
Test of autocorrelation  of order 2  0.03  -1.33  -0.07
0 979  0 183  0 942
Sargan Test  149.39 (126)  144.79 (133)  149.82 (127)
008  022  008
One-step estiates are  reported
Stendar0  rmrs are conected for hetemaschadas"t
Year dummies are Included
Notes: * = 10% significance  level. *  5% significance  level. ***  1%  significance  level.
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11abe 7:  ]E  pacie  of Contmretualg  Savngs8  oam  Capital Markets
(Bank Based / Marlket Based)
Elmt diftmomne  dynamic  ae  aaGM  a,ao
Depondent Varlablo:  Otock Markot CapItalIxa3on  Ofbc$ Tmded  TotsI  Docmtic Bondo
(%  GDP)  G%  OP)  (5 GDP)
Explanatory Varlabloo
(lagged)
Lagged  dependent vadiable  0.72O  0.62o  0.56°
z75  4 72  3.27
CS financial assets ahere  ANK  -0.47  -1.36  1.07°
-0.49  -1.54  2.98
MKT  2.21t  0.71  0.34t
2.66  0.78  226
Inflation  0.69  0.610  -0.07
1.44  1.66  40.57
R@al  Interest Rate  -0.05  -0.4  0.35
-0.05  -0.6  1.1
Real  Retum  on Stock Markot Index  0.14°  0.14°  -0.009
1.78  1.92  -0.38
Inflation (volablity)  -0.03°°°  -0.0002  -0.001
-a.79  -0.03  -0.83
Real  Interest Rate  (volatility)  -0.0004  0.004  0.002°
40.14  1.33  2.04
Real  Stock Market  Retum  (vol&tlity)  -9.350  -0.72473  0.26
-1.86  -1.44  1.25
GDP/capita (constant  US $)  9.08E-03  5.0SE-0  -4.9E-60
1.6  0.92  -1.69
Number of Obs.  161  160  161
Number  of Groups  28  28  28
Weld Test  3281.54  1918.27  367.82
aoint significance)  16  16  16
Test of autocorrelation of order 1  -2.23  -1.65  -2.57
0.026  0o.8  0.010
Test of autocorrelaiion  of order 2  -0.05  -1.33  0.13
0.961  0.164  0.W4
Sargan  Test  149.82 (127)  144.29 (134)  45.43 (36)
ace  0.26  0.13
Ono4tap os3bO  alms  am mpwlt
Slandard atws  a  oro ced brhlomschcdaatW.
Yoardumnbs  am Mch&uad.
Notes: ° = 10% significance  level.  °  = 5% significance  level. °°  = 1%  significance  level.
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Table 8: Impact of Contractual Savings on Capital Markets
(Voluntary / Mandatory Pension  Systems)
Fiint difference dynamic panel data GMM estimator
Dependent Variable:  Stock Market Capitalization  Stock Traded  Total Domestic Bonds
(%  GOP)  (%  GDP)  (%  GDP)
Explanatory Variables
(lagged)
Lagged dependent variable  0.79-  0 79-  0.67  0.69  0.61-  0.62
785  752  488  4.98  413  388
CS financial  assets share  Mandatl  3.26.  1.74-  0.70
4.15  185  19
Volunti  1 09  . -0.44  . 0.21
1.43  -064  0.63
Mandat2  . 3.39  . 2.52  . 0.62-
431  2 64  195
Volunt2  1  23  . -0.51  . 0 45
1  45  -067  1.24
Inflabon  0.73  0 69  0.71-  0.78-  0.008  -0.006
148  135  207  229  0.06  -005
Real  Interest Rate  -0 27  -0 46  -0 53  -0 59  0.55-  0.56-
-0.29  0.49  -0 82  -0  92  z09  208
Real  Retum on Stock Market Index  0.14'  0.14-  0.14^  0.14^  -0 009  -0.008
1.61  1 78  1 93  191  -0.33  -0.3
Inflation (volablity)  -0.032  -0.033-  -0 002  -0 001  0 00004  -3.56E-08
-3 7  -.82  -025  .0.23  0.03  0
Real Interest  Rate (volatlity)  -0 00002  0 0002  0 004  0.004  0.0019-  0.0018-
-001  007  1  43  1  5  2.29  241
Real Stock Market Retum (volatility)  -1.48-  -1.42-  -0.84  -0.82  0 31  0.32
-2  03  -195  -16  -15.s  1.57  1.57
GDP/capita (constant US S)  9.9E-6-  9 5E-6-  7.03E-06  10 3E-6  -3.83E-06  -3.79E-06
168  1.68  1.32  2 05  -1.38  -1.4
Number of Obs.  161  161  180  160  161  161
Number of Groups  28  28  28  28  28  28
Wald  Test  3150 88  5636.46  1127 59  1290.71  538.79  809.62
joint significance)  16  16  16  18  16  16
Test of autocorrelation of order 1  -2 37  -2.36  -1  84  -1.63  -2.72  -2.63
0.018  0  o01  0 102  0104  0  007  0 009
Test of autocorrelation of order 2  0.12  0  -1.27  -1.35  -0 02  -0 01
0908  0.990  o 202  0 176  0 866  0 994
Sargan  Test  145.36 (127)  147.17 (127)  142 54 (134)  140.14 (134)  42.51 (36)  43 92 (36)
0.13  O01  029  0.34  021  017
Oneastp estimates arae  ,poutd.
Standamrd  eiw  am conuected  for hetemoshedasqty
Year dumnmb  ate bduded
Notes:  *  = 10% significance  level. *  = 5%  significance  level. **  1%  significance level.
- 24 -Gregorio Impavido, Alberto R.  Musalem and Thierry  Tressel
1  abile 9: Fmpact of Conftractual  savmgs on  CanpiAita  Mairkets
(CapftaR Account - SecurEties Assets + Liabilities)
first difference dmnamic asnel date GMM estimator
Dependent Variable:  Stock Wlarket Capitalization  Stock Traded  Total Domestic Bonds
(%  GDP)  (%  GDP)  (%  GDP)
Explanatory Variables
(lagged)
Lagged dependent vanable  0.73-  0.62-  0 66-
713  3.09  5.29
CS financial assets share  High  1.14  -0.76  0.52-
101  -0.73  3.16
Low  1 37°  -0.59  -0.16
1 68  -047  -0.39
Inflation  0.71'  0.75'  0.12
1.72  1.9  0.78
Real Interest Rate  0.19  -0.05  0 64-
024  -0.1  26
Real Return  on Stock Market Index  0.11  0.12  -0  02
154  1 68  -0.82
Inflation (volatility)  -0 035"  -0.001  0.001
-395  -0.18  061
Real Interest Rate (volatility)  -0.0006  0 003  0 0015°°
-0.22  1.02  198
Real Stock Market Retum (volatility)  -1.27°  -0.68  0.33
-1.91  -131  1  56
GDP/capita  (constant US $)  7.50E-06  1.01 E-05  -1 27E-06
1  33  1.39  -0.75
Capital Account  0.96"  0.26  0.21
Portfolio Openness  179  .39  1
Number of Obs.  147  146  147
Number of Groups  26  26  26
Wald Test  3816.91  3571.51  711.04
(oint  significance)  17  17  17
Test of autocorrelation  of order 1  -1.84  -1.44  -2.5
0 087  0150  0.012
Test of autocorrelation of order 2  -0.57  -0.7  0 4
0572  0485  0.692
Sargan Test  133.21  (128)  126.59 (135)  40.21 (37)
036  069  033
One-step esnmates eare  rpoted.
Standard efo,rs are cormcted Fbr hetermschedasfcfly.
Year dumrmes aem  Inckded
Notes:  ¢ = 10% significance  level.  = 5% significance  level. t  = 1% significance level.
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Table 10: Impact of Contractual Saving on Capital Markets (Transparency)
First difference dynamic Danel data GMM estimator
Dependent Variable:  Stock Market Capitalization  Stock Traded
(% GDP)  (%  GDP)
Explanatory Variables
(lagged)
Lagged dependent variable  0.69***  0.63***
7.98  472
CS financial assets share  -5.18  -7.82*
-1  36  -1.66
CS financial assets share  0.09*  0.11*
* Accounting Std.  1  76  1 68
Inflation  0.57  0.54*
112  1.65
Real Interest Rate  -0.36  -0.50
-0.37  -0 77
Real Return on Stock Market Index  0.12  0.14*
1.46  1.82
Inflation (volatility)  -0.03***  -0.0002
-3 81  -0.03
Real Interest Rate (volatility)  -0.0005  0.003
-016  0 98
Real Stock Market Return (volatility)  -1.30*  -0,88
-1 64  -1 48
GDP/capita (constant US $)  6.94E-06  3.34E-06
1.16  062
Number of Obs.  151  150
Number of Groups  25  25
Wald Test  9352.73  1169.61
joint significance)  16  16
Test of autocorrelation of order 1  -2.23  -1.63
002  0.10
Test of autocorrelation of order 2  -0.12  -1.28
091  020
Sargan  Test  139.19 (138)  134.36  (135)
0.24  0 50
One-step eshmates are reported
Standard errors are corrected for heteroschedasticity
Year dummies are included
Notes:  = 10% significance  level. *  = 5% significance  level.  I  = 1% significance  level.
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TablRe an: llRmpad of Comtractual Savings  onn Capital  Markets
(eommposition  of Contractual Savings)
Fidlffm;  dnamm  send  dnta GMM  estmm
Dependont Varlble:  Stock Market Capitlisauon  Stock Tmaded  Total Domenoc  Sondo
(% OPD)  (%  GDP)  (%  GDP)
Ezplanatory Varlablmo
(lagged)
Lagged dependent variable  0.58°  0.46°  0.57°
291  2.43  278
CS financial assets share  CSFAhat  1.19  -0.96  -0.53
a43  -0.51  4 73
CSFAres  3.03-  1.003  0.61°
247  1 01  3 48
Inflatlon  0.03  0.49  -0.04
004  083  -018
Real Interest Rate  -1.04  -0.29  0.73
.064  -021  1.43
Real Return on Stock Market Index  0.10  0 10  -0.05°
102  1.1  -265
Inflaton (volatlity)  0.002  -0.07  0.02
ao1  -427  0.37
Real Interest Rate (volatilty)  0.0002  0.003  0.02
aca  1.05  1.78
Real Stock Market Retum (volatlity)  -0.95  -0.24  0.62°
-1.23  -0.44  4 09
GDP/capita (constant US S)  2.43E-08  2.30E-08  -8.33E-08
023  02  -1.36
NumberofObs.  108  1C8  108
Number of Groups  23  23  23
Wald Test  440.8  420.21  493.97
aolnt signIflcance)  14  14  14
Test of autocorrelaton  of ordir 1  -1.94  -1.67  -1.68
0 05  0.09  00934
Test of autocorrelation of order 2  0.57  -0.78  0.81
057  043  0418
Sargan  Test  93.19 (98)  84.98 (103)  41.6 (33)
062  090  014
OnoS.tOp estO8bW  Bs t,3peWt
Starnd  enwsalc  conr;  d orhemsdds±tjg
Year  duramms am fthd8d
Notes:  ¢ = 10% significance level. °  5% significance level.  °  = 1% significance level.
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